How Private Must an Objectionably Private Language Be? :: Philosophy Philosophical Papers

How Private Must an Objectionably Private Language Be? ABSTRACT: Some philosophers, taking their cue from Philosophical Investigations (PI) 243-315, suppose that a private language is objectionable only when its terms refer to Cartesian mental events. Others (notably Kripke) have focused on PI 201 and the surrounding remarks about rule following, and have explicated the notion of an objectionable private language as (roughly) that of a language used by just one isolated individual unsupported at any time by any source of external or community correction and approval. I attempt to defend Kripke's account against some objections proffered by Simon Blackburn. Blackburn supposes that individuals are no worse off than communities with respect to the difficulties raised by Kripke, and argues that the "paradox" of PI 201 can be avoided by a proper understanding of extended dispositions, and by grasping the possibility of private practices. But Blackburn misconstrues what it is to go on in the "same" way in following a rule, and ignores the plac e of constitutive rules in practices. Some philosophers, taking their cue from Philosophical Investigations (PI) 243 - 315, suppose that a private language is objectionable only when its terms refer to Cartesian mental events. In this "strong" sense private languages are very private indeed. Others (notably Kripke, 1982) have focused on PI 201 and the surrounding remarks about rule following, and have explicated the notion of an objectionably private language as (roughly) that of a language used by just one isolated individual unsupported at any time by any source of external or community correction and approval. I think of this as a "weaker" sense of 'private language.' In sec. 1 I attempt to defend the "Kripke - Wittgenstein" (henceforth 'KW') version of the private language argument against some objections proffered by Simon Blackburn. KW takes languages which are private in the weaker sense to be objectionable, and claims that the later discussion (PI 243 - 315) deals with a "special case" falling under the more general discussion of rule following in earlier sections. In section II I briefly consider some possible objections from Wittgenstein himself to my defense of Kripke. I "This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule"(PI 201). According to KW the reason any course of action could accord with the rule is that there is no fact about an individual to which he can point in justifying going on one way (in the application of a word, continuation of a number series, etc.